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EQUAL RIGHT OF ACCESS IN MATTERS OF
TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION: ITS
PROSPECTS IN INDUSTRIAL AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Transboundary pollution presents an inherently international
problem. Consider a valley framed by foothills on the east and
west. On one side of the valley is a small coal-fired power plant.
On the other side live several ranch families. The plant spews soot
and noxious gases which are carried by the prevailing wind toward
the ranchers. Frequently, the weather is such that the soot and
gases condense, irritating the eyes and lungs of the ranchers. In
almost every nation, the ranchers would have a cause of action
against the power plant for the nuisance.'
Now, however, place a national boundary through the valley's
center. Under this circumstance the ranchers would have to seek a
remedy for an international wrong. This recourse could be timeconsuming, circuitous and obstacle-ridden.2 Neither a hearing nor
relief would be certain. For these ranchers, a boundary has transformed an otherwise local dispute into an international controversy
1. See A. REITZE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 5-20---5-45 (1972); ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (H. Johnson & M. Johnson, eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICIES]; ENVIRONMENTAL

POLLUTION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS:

AN

INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM (S. McCaffrey & R. Lutz eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION]. See also A. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION

(1983).
2. Victims of transboundary pollution may face a number of obstacles before gaining
relief. For instance, they might: (1) be unable to obtain personal jurisdiction in their national court; (2) be compelled to exhaust local remedies before being able to press an international claim; (3) lack standing to sue in the domestic court of the polluter's state; (4) be
denied a hearing by the responsible foreign administrative agencies and (5) be frustrated by a
claim of sovereign immunity. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 282-86 (6th ed. 1963);
McCaffrey, Trans-boundaryPollutionInjuries."JurisdictionalConsiderationsin Private Litigalion Between Canadaand the United States, 3 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 191, 195 (1973); Comment, Standing and Sovereign Immunity: Hurdles for Environmental Litigants, 12 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 122 (1972); Note, InternationalLiability andPrimary Rules of Obligation.-An
Application to Acid Rain in the United States and Canada, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 11
(1983). Also, as private citizens, such victims might be unable to submit a claim to the International Court of Justice. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34,

59 Stat. 1091, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1186. See J. BRIERLY, supra, at 285-87. See generally
Bleicher, An Overview of InternationalEnvironmentalRegulation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. I (1972).
3. Hoffman, State Responsibility in InternationalLaw and TransboundaryPollution Injuries, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 509, 510-12 (1976); McCaffrey, supra note 1, at 196.
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whose ultimate resolution may be far more complex.4
The legal problems posed by this hypothetical situation are not
novel.' However, they received little governmental attention until
environmental degradation became an urgent concern.6 The first
manifestation of worldwide environmental concern was the 1972
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. At this conference, countries of disparate political and economic character met to determine a new direction for
environmental action.7 Chief among the proposed guidelines was
Principle 22, which stated: "States shall co-operate to develop further the international law regarding liability and compensation for
victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdicition or control of such States to areas
beyond their jurisdiction. '
Following the Stockholm Conference, several national governments and international organizations responded to the challenge
of Principle 22.' To date, the most notable and potentially promising response can be found in the environmental work of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). °
In essence, this international organization's approach to trans4. While private domestic legal proceedings may appear more streamlined and predictable than international ones, this may not always be true. The assumption that
all private legal proceedings are 'ordinary', do not involve extra-legal controversy,
and are largely free of procedural problems related to jurisdictional considerations
• . .is incorrect. For example, some local United States jurisdictions follow the
Canadian rule requiring a court to refuse jurisdiction in a controversy over injuries
to property located outside the court's jurisdiction.
Hoffman, supra note 3, at 512.
5. The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between Canada and the United States is an
example of the early recognition of the legal problems arising from transboundary pollution.
The procedure espoused in this treaty to handle private injuries was an early form of an
equal right of access. 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, May 13, 1910, United States-Canada,
13 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548.
6. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 509.
7. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF 48/14 & Corr. 1 (1972), reprintedin 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1416 (1972).
8. Id. Principle 22.
9. A. LEVIN, PROTECTING THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 1-38 (1977).
10. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a
regional economic organization established in 1961 to replace the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which had been created in 1948 to coordinate common action among Marshall Plan recipient countries recovering from
World War II . . . . Several specialized committees have been established to serve
the Organization, one of which is the Environment Committee set up in 1970. ...
"[Tihe object of the Committee and the Directorate of the international secretariat
that serves it is to help Governments make decisions on environmental policy."
Grieves, Regional Efforts at International Environment Protection, 12 INT'L LAw. 309, 320-21
(1978) (footnotes omitted).
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boundary pollution is derived from two rather elementary propositions. First, liability for a polluting activity follows the pollution
(the principle of nondiscrimination)." Second, persons affected by
pollution in their national State (receptor State) by pollution emanating from another State (originating State) would be assured access to the appropriate administrative and judicial proceedings of
the originating State to litigate their claims. This second proposition is described by OECD as the principle of equal right of access.' 2 This principle and its practicability in matters of
transboundary pollution will be the focus of this Comment.
The general concept of an equal right of access is not unprecedented in pollution control laws.' 3 As of yet, however, such a right
has not been widely adopted.' 4 Currently, victims of transboundary pollution, such as the ranchers in the above illustration,
find few treaty 5 or statutory 6 applications of the equal right of
access. The limited applications of the equal right of access have
provided little information regarding the possibility of its more
widespread implementation. Nonetheless, this possibility will be
examined,' 8 using industrialized and developing countries' 9 as the'7

11.

As formulated by OECD, the principle of nondiscrimination holds that
polluters causing transfrontier pollution should be subject to legal or statutory provisions no less severe than those which would apply for any equivalent pollution
occurring within their country, under comparable conditions and in comparable
zones, taking into account, when appropriate, the special nature and environmental
needs of the zone affected ....
OECD, Recommendations of the Council on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution,
tit. c(4)(a), OECD Doc. C(74)224 (1974), reprintedin 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 242, 245
(1975) [hereinafter cited as OECD Principles].
12. OECD Principles, supra note 11, tit. D.
13. See 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 5.
14. A. LEVIN, supra note 9, at 31-38; Mingst, Evaluating Public and Private Approaches
to InternationalSolutions to Acid Rain Pollution, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 5 (1982); Willheim,
PrivateRemediesfor TransfrontierEnvironmentalDamage. A Critiqueof OECD's Doctrineof
Equal Right to Access, 7 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 174 (1981).
15. Eg., Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, done on Feb. 19,
1974, reprintedin 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 591 (1974).
16. Eg., Clean Air Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7415(c) (1976 & Supp. 1981).
17. A. LEVIN, supra note 9, at 31-38; Willheim, supra note 14, at 178.
18. It should be noted that the actual decision to incorporate an equal right of access
into a country's environmental law will largely be determined by economic and political
variables. A detailed discussion of these variables, however, is beyond the scope of this
Comment. See generally OECD, ECONOMICS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION (1976).
19. A precise definitional distinction between industrial and developing countries has
not been undertaken in this Comment. Generally, the term "industrial countries" will be
used to refer to the major industrialized countries of the world. "Developing countries," on
the other hand, will refer to countries which are members of the Third World and are generally considered to be currently undeveloped.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

3

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1 [], Art. 8
1984

TRANSBOUNDARY

POLLUTION

oretical target States for adoption of the equal right of access.
The industrialized-developing dichotomy provides a widespectrum testing of the practicability of the equal right of access.
The environmental positions of the industrialized and developing
countries are not only diverse, but are often diametrical.2 0 Their
respective positions represent the extremes of experience with, concern about and laws relating to pollution. 2 Thus, in order to implement an equal right of access between these countries, a large
array of environmental perspectives must be considered.2 2 This diversity provides an acid test for the equal right of access since its
viability must be grounded in cooperation and common environmental values.23
This Comment will analyze the prospects for implementing an
equal right of access for victims of transboundary pollution. Initially, the OECD's development of and rationale for the equal right
of access will be reviewed. Subsequently, obstacles to its adoption
by industrial and developing countries will be examined. These
countries' perspectives on obstacles such as variance in pollution
definitions, access to scientific and technical data, the character of
domestic environmental law, and the likelihood of enforcing a
valid judgment will be specifically addressed. Finally, the practicability of the equal right of access between industrialized and developing nations will be discussed.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUAL RIGHT OF

ACCESS

The concept of equal right of access was formalized by the environmental work of the OECD.2 4 This work began in the late
1960's after member countries expressed growing concern over
20. "[Developing countries] saw ecological concern of the type displayed by the industrialized countries as irrelevant and, at some point, even detrimental to their own interests."
Juda, InternationalEnvironmental Concern.- Perspectives of and Implicationsfor Developing
States, in THE GLOBAL PREDICAMENT 90 (1979).

21. de Araujo Castro, Environment and Development.- The Case of the Developing Countries, 21 INT'L ORG. 401 (1972).

22. See infra text accompanying notes 189-94.
23. Id.
24. The current membership of OECD includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. OECD, THE STATE OF
THE ENVIRONMENT IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES 5 (1979).
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transboundary air and water pollution control. 25 As viewed by the
OECD, these problems were "intrinsically international" 26 in that
pollution could readily cross boundaries and affect the global environment. Guidelines for international cooperation were clearly
needed.
Such guidelines were proposed and adopted by the OECD
membership in 1974.27 These propositions, "Recommendations of
28
the Council on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution,
were "designed to facilitate development of harmonized environmental policies with a view toward solving transfrontier pollution
problems. 2 9 Of particular concern here are the principles of nondiscrimination 3" and equal right of access. 3'
The principle of nondiscrimination is the central concept of
the OECD environmental scheme. In essence, this concept is simply an environmental golden rule; that is, "[D]o not do unto others
what you do not want done unto yourself. ' 32 Thus, under a regime
of nondiscrimination, a party causing transboundary pollution
would be subject to the same sanctions that would have been available had the harm occurred within the polluter's sovereign State.3 3
Governmental policies for controlling pollution originating in the
State which wanders abroad would be no less severe than if the
pollution had remained contained.34 Costs for pollution abatement
would also follow the trail of pollution under the adjunct principle
35
that the "polluter pays."

While nondiscrimination extends a State's responsibility for
pollution, it does not guarantee equivalent responsibility among
States. Under this principle, a State's liability for pollution is deter25. Smets, The OECD Approach to the Solution of TransfrontierPollution Problems, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3 (J. Nowak ed. 1976).
26. OECD, OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7 (1979).

27. OECD Principles, supra note 1i.
28. Id.
29. Id. tit. A.
30. Id. tit. C.
31. Id. tit. D. The concept of equal right of access was first described as an equal right
of hearing in the OECD Principles in 1974. It was subsequently modified in 1976 to better
correspond to the French title (Principle d' 6galite6 d' accks). OECD, Report on EqualRight
ofAccess in Relation to TransfrontierPollution, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 23 (OECD 1977).

32. Stein, The OECD Guiding Principles on Transfrontier Pollution, 6 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 245 (1976).

33. OECD Principles, supra note 11, tit. C.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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mined by its domestic law and environmental policy. 36 States with
weak pollution control measures would thus incur less liability than
37
States assiduously seeking protection of the environment.
The differences in costs and "pollution rights" that would accrue from application of the principle of nondiscrimination would
not be conducive to international cooperation.3 8 As a result, the

OECD sought a mechanism which would encourage continued harmonization of pollution standards and laws. The equal right of access was developed to provide this impetus.3 9
The equal right of access is the procedural arm of nondiscrimination. In both its original formulation' and its later refinement 4
the equal right of access provided that persons affected by transfrontier pollution4 2 should be accorded rights "equivalent to those
36. Id.
37. Smets, supra note 25, at 6.
38. The OECD Principles are predicated upon the concept of international solidarity,
that is, a commitment to a "concerted long term policy for the protection and improvement
of the environment." Smets, supra note 25, at 5.
39. Id. at 7.
40. Countries should make every effort to introduce, where not already in existence, a system affording equal right of hearing according to which:
(a) whenever a project, a new activity or a course of conduct may create a significant risk of transfrontier pollution and is investigated by public authorities, those
who may be affected by such pollultion should have the same rights of standing in
judicial or administrative proceedings in the country where it originates as those of
that country; (b) whenever transfrontier pollution gives rise to damage in a country,
those who are affected by such pollution should have the same rights of standing in
judicial or administrative proceedings in the country where such pollution
originates as those of that country, and they should be extended procedural rights
equivalent to the rights extended to those of that country.
OECD Principles, supra note 11, tit. D.
41. The rights accorded to persons affcted by .sfrntier
pollution shold be
equivalent to those accorded to persons whose personal and/or proprietary interest
within the territory of the country where the transfrontier pollution originates are
or may be affected under similar conditions by a same pollution, as regards:
(a) information concerning projects, new activities and courses of conduct which
may give rise to a significant risk of pollution;
(b) access to information which the competent authorities make available to persons concerned;
(c) the participation in hearings and preliminary inquiries and the making of objections in respect to proposed decisions by the public authorities which could directly or indirectly lead to pollution;
(d) recourse to and standing in administrative and judicial procedures (including
emergency procedures);
in order to prevent pollution, or to have it abated and/or obtain compensation for
the damage caused.
OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Equal Right of Access in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, annex, para. 2, OECD Doc. C(76) 55 (Final) (1976).
42. The OECD defines transfrontier pollution as "pollution originating in one country
and having effects within other countries." OECD, Report on the Implementation of a Regime
of Equal Access and Non-Discriminationin Relation to TransfrontierPollution, in LEGAL AsPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 58 (OECD 1977).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol14/iss1/8

6

Caputo: Equal Right of Access in Matters of Transboundary Pollution: Its
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 14

accorded to persons whose personal and/or proprietary interests
within the territory of the country where the transfrontier pollution
originates are or may be affected under similar conditions by a
same pollution . ...
The theoretical impact of an equal right of access is twofold.
First, it would advance private international law in regard to pollution control and liability." With assured access to courts and administrative tribunals, foreigners could present claims to the
originating State "to ensure legal protection of their interests. 45
These adjudicated claims would be important for both the potential
46
remedy and the precedential value of the decision.
Second, the equal right of access would affect the character4 7
and development of domestic environmental law. 41 In assuring access to foreign courts and tribunals, the equal right of access implicitly, if not explicitly, 49 forces a State to examine its environmental
laws vis-A-vis those of cooperating States." Perceived differences
in these laws would be signals for potentially differing treatment of
complainants. A State, after identifying these disparities, would
not likely open its courts to foreigners without some assurance that
its nationals would receive equivalent treatment in the respective
foreign States. 1 The adoption5 2 and sustained use of an equal
43. OECD, supra note 41.
44. Smets, supra note 25, at 8.
45. Id.
46. Hoffman, supra note 3, at 512.
47. In this context, the character of domestic environmental law refers to both its nature
and scope. See infra text accompanying notes 125-27.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 188-94.
49. The United States' Clean Air Act provides access for foreigners to certain environmental proceedings, but this access is conditioned on reciprocity with the foreign State.
Clean Air Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7415(c) (1976 & Supp. 1981).
50. OECD, supra note 42, at 124.
51. At times, States do adjudicate certain foreign claims, such as tax disputes or status
determinations, without seeking equivalent treatment for its nationals. See F. DAwsON & 1.
HEAD, INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL TRIBUNALS, AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS (1971).

However, it is not clear how willingly a State would accept a foreigner's environmental claim
if there was no reciprocity between the States. McCaffrey, The OECD Principles Concerning
TransfrontierPollution. A Commentary, I ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 2, 3 (1975). Consider, for
example, two neighboring States, A and B, that share a common river basin. Both have
water pollution laws limiting the dumping of industrial wastes into the river. State A, however, limits recovery to plaintiffs injured by such damage to $2,000. State B, on the other
hand, has no such limit and allows full compensation plus costs. Any person in State B
injured by transboundary river pollution from State A would therefore be disadvantaged,
even before litigation begins, in seeking relief.
Nationals from State A, however, would be encouraged because of the potential for full
compensation, to fully and thoroughly press their claims. Obviously, these disputes could be
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right of access would thus require some resolution of these perceived differences. 3 The resolution process, in turn, would result in
greater harmonization of domestic environmental law. 4
But it is the persistence of differing views on environmental
law and pollution abatement that creates obstacles to the adoption
of the equal right of access." The bases for these differences must
therefore be examined in order to speculate about the implementation of the equal right of access.
II.

COMPARATIVE VIEWS OF OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION
IN INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

A.

Variance in Defining Pollution

There is no international consensus on how pollution should
be defined, except to recognize human activity as the cause. 6
However, a precise definition of pollution is imperative for two reasons. First, it determines the scope of those activities which a State
considers to be polluting. Second, it determines the threshold at
which legal consequences, especially liability, attach to those
activities. 7
Pollution, in regard to international law, has been categorized
into five separate concepts. 8 These are: pollution as (1) any alteration of the existing environment; (2) the right of a territorial sovereign; (3) damage; (4) interference with other uses of the
environment; and (5) exceeding the assimilative capacity of the environment.5 9 The first two conceptualizations represent the exmore equitably resolved if reciprocal treatment for transboundary injuries existed between
these States.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 188-94.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 202-03.
54. "Harmonization encourages coordinated, unilateral national efforts for environmental protection based on the existing similarity of many nations' environmental laws and
policies." Lutz, An Essay on Harmonizing National Environmental Laws and Policies, I
ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 132, 132 (1975).
55. "Without ... joint action, different countries might easily define totally divergent
and inconsistent long-term policies, which would frustrate the stated objective of the [OECD
Principles] . . . as a whole, namely, 'to facilitate the development of harmonized environmental policies with a view to solving transfrontier pollution problems.'" McCaffrey, supra
note 5 i, at 2 (footnote omitted).
56. Nanda, The Establishmentof InternationalStandards/orTransnationalEnvironmentalInjury, 60 IowA L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1975).
57. Id.
58. Springer, Toward a Meaningful Concept ofPollutionin InternationalLaw, 26 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 531 (1977).
59. Id.
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tremes of pollution: absolute environmental purity in the first
instance, and unrestrained environmental tampering in the second.
The remaining categories, depending on the application, are more
moderate and more commonly recognized in modem environmen60
tal law.
At first blush, definitional problems would not appear to be an
obstacle to the implementation of an equal right of access. Generally, each statute or convention would be expected to contain its
own pollution standards. However, the definitions contained in
statutes and conventions are usually vague and imprecise. 6 1 Further complications arise from occasional discrepancies between the
defined standard and the willingness of a State to attach liability to
alleged violations. 62 This problem is particularly prevalent with the
broader definitions of pollution, such as alteration of the existing
environment. Under this definition, the question of "harm" must
be equated to current scientific "speculation. ' 63 Precision under
these circumstances is illusory, and liability uncertain.
1. The Perspective of IndustrialCountries. Pollution is largely
a byproduct of industrialization; therefore, the industrial countries
suffer most in its grip.', Not surprisingly, they lead the way in sensitivity to and concern about pollution abatement. 65 This can be
seen in the willingness of these countries to adopt broad definitions
of pollution in their domestic laws and international agreements.6 6
OECD's own concept of pollution, 67 having been drafted by the
world's major industrial powers, is illustrative of these wide-ranging definitions. It embodies four recognized concepts: alteration of
the environment, damage, interference with other uses, and exceeding the environment's assimilative capacity.6 8
60. Id. at 531-51.
61. Id. at 532.
62. Ross, National Sovereignty in InternationalEnvironmental Decisions, 2 NAT. RESOURCES J. 243 (1972).

63. See infra text accompanying notes 74-75.
64. de Araujo Castro, supra note 21, at 402-10.
65. Id.
66. See ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, supra note 1.

67. "Pollution means any introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substance or
energy into the environment resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger
human health, harm living resources and ecosystems, impair amenities or interfere with
other legitimate uses of the environment." OECD, Recommendation of the Council for the
Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation
to Transfrontier Pollution, at 3, OECD Doc. C(77) 28 (Final)(1977).
68. Id.; Springer, supra note 58, at 531-5 1.
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Pollution as a prerogative of sovereign action,6 9 the least restrictive definition of pollution, is noticeably absent from definitions in industrial nations.7 0 Such a characterization is inflexible
and reflects a lack of concern about extraterritorial injury. The industrialized nations' sensitivity to pollution essentially precludes
endorsement of such a definition.7"
The industrialized countries have been flexible in defining pollution.7 2 They have recognized the interdependence of the elements of the biosphere.7 3 As a consequence, they have been willing
to define disequilibrium7 4 as potentially harmful. Such a definition
is extremely sensitive to environmental activity and establishes a
very low threshold for recognizing harm.
A problem arises, however, when this harm is difficult to define scientifically. In such situations, these countries have sought to
stop further degradation by adopting emission controls rather than
waiting for perfected environmental quality standards. The United
States' ban on chlorofluorocarbons in aerosol spray cans to decrease the decay of the ozone layer is an example of this trend.7 5
2. The Perspective of Developing Countries. Developing
countries tend to define pollution more narrowly.7 6 Generally,
these nations view pollution as immediate damage to the environment or interference with desired uses of land, water or resources.77
69. Springer, supra note 58, at 535.
70. See ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, supra note 1.
71. Historically, the industrialized countries' attempts to define pollution as a sovereign

activity have met with assertions of hypocrisy and political scorn. For instance, the United
States' claim to unlimited right of use as an upper riparian over the basins of the Colorado,
Rio Grande and Tijuana Rivers has been severely criticized. These comments have been so
caustic that this so-called Harmon Doctrine is unlikely to emerge again in the United States
policy regarding international waters. See Comment, Effluent Neighbors. The MexicoUnited States Water Quality Dilemma, 3 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 152 (1972).
72. Springer, supra note 58, at 548-50.
73. The biosphere is generally defined as: "the portion of the earth and its atmosphere

that is capable of supporting life." A. REITZE, supra note 1, at 2-2.
74. Environmental disequilibrium, in this context, refers to a rupturing of the closed
and interdependent system in which all living things are held. For example, certain synthetic
chemicals, such as polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB), cannot be broken down by normal environmental processes. Thus, their very existence creates a disequilibrium that "pollutes" the
natural world. Jackson, Dimensions of InternationalPollution, 50 OR. L. REV. 223, 241-42
(1971).

75.
& POL.
76.
77.

Taubenfeld, The Atmosphere." Change, Politicsand World Law, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L.
469, 477-78 (1981).
See ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES, supra note 1.
Id.
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This is due largely to their limited experience with pollution.78 In
most developing countries, pollution is confined to industrial areas,
away from the majority of the population.7 9
A detailed study of the environmental laws8" of sixty-three developing countries 8' reveals the trend toward narrow definitions
of
83
82
pollution. The domestic environmental laws of Cyprus, Gabon
and Kenya 84 are apt examples of this trend. Although exceedingly
different in their political thoughts, each nation defines pollution as
direct injury to public health, the buildup of toxic substances, and
misuse or contamination of public waters. Broader definitions of
pollution, however, are absent from their domestic laws.85
International pollution agreements among developing countries also reflect the use of narrow definitions and emphasis on nonconflicting uses. The Indus Waters Treaty between India and
Pakistan provides that sewage and industrial waste must be treated
so as not to conflict with "uses similar in nature to those which the
waters were put on the Effective Date [of the treaty]." 8 6
The Treaty on the River Plate Basin, signed by Bolivia, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay, also seeks a "reasonable utilization of
water resources particularly through regulation of water sources
and their multiple and equitable uses ...

"87

In addition to limiting the scope of pollution definitions, developing countries sometimes rigidly and, at other times, arbitrarily
apply them.8 8 These variations in application usually occur when
78. de Araujo Castro, supra note 21, at 412.
79. "Environmental deterioration, as it is currently understood in some developed
countries, is a minor localized problem in the developing world." Id.
80. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES, supra note 1.
81. The countries surveyed in this study were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa, Chad, China
(Taiwan), Congo, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Salvador, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia. Id.
82. Id. at 827770/00.
83. Id. at 837900/00.
84. Id. at 869160/00.
85. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES, supra note 1.
86. The Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Sept 19, 1960, India, Pakistan, and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, art. III, 419 U.N.T.S. 138.
87. Nanda, supra note 56, at 1103; Treaty on the River Plate Basin, Apr. 23, 1969, art. 1,
reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 905, 906 (1969).
88. See generally Leonard & Morell, Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing
Countries: A PoliticalPerspective, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 281 (1981).
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economic and political concerns dominate pollution abatement
plans.8 9 As a result, even though pollution may be properly identified, there is no certainty that the stated definition will be applied in
litigation or enforcement procedures. 90
To a large extent, the perspective of the developing countries
can be traced to the importance they place on sovereignty. 9 1 Repeatedly, developing countries have expressed concern that a
broader definition of pollution would limit their national prerogatives. Many endorse the statement that "[any ecological policy,
globally applied, should not be an instrument to suppress wholly or
in part the legitimate right of any country to decide its own af'
fairs." 92
The affairs of particular concern to the developing countries are economic. These nations fear that an "emphasis on nonpolluting technology and recycling may eliminate or reduce demand for [their] raw materials . .." and that "developed nations
will [unilaterally] create rigorous environmental standards for
products traded internationally," thereby excluding the nonconforming goods of developing countries from the market. 93 Such
fears, if realized, could further economically disadvantage these
countries. Characterizing pollution as a sovereign activity provides
a defense to this threat.
In summary, definitions of pollution in developing countries
tend to be narrow and emphasize conflicting uses. Their limited
scope is a reflection of the lack of significant and widespread pollution in these countries and the desire to make sovereign and autonomous decisions regarding pollution and its control.
B. Access to Scientic and Technical Injormation
Technical and scientific information provides the yardstick by
which environmental problems and projects to remediate them are
measured. Access to competent information is essential to the elaborate equations and models used in environmental decisions.9 4
When faced with an environmental dilemma, the lack of such information can delay crucial action. For example, several nations
have postponed definitive action to control the use of chlorofluoro89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 299; see supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
Leonard & Morell, supra note 88, at 299.
de Araujo Castro, supra note 21, at 412-14.
de Araujo Castro, supra note 21, at 413.
Id.
T. O'RIORDAN, ENVIRONMENTALISM 1-36 (1976).
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carbons until its link to ozone degradation is "more conclusively"
proven.9 5 "This reluctance to act exists despite . . .authoritative

reports issued by the National Academy of Sciences in 1977 and
1979, by the World Meteorological Organization, and by the Staff
of the United Nations Environment Programme."9' 6 These same
findings suggest that control programs in just a few countries could
have an immediate and ameliorative impact on ozone
degradation.9 7
The information availability problem has another aspect as
well, that is, the relevance of the information to the particular environmental problem being faced. Actions based on information
which is not circumspect of the environmental variables in issue
will produce less-than-desired results, and possibly disastrous
ones.

98

Adequate access to competent and relevant scientific information should thus be seen as a critical determinant of a State's environmental policies. In turn, such policies, generated by shared
information, should be seen as critical determinants of the common
environmental values which support an equal right of access. 99
1. The Perspective in Industrial Countries. The industrial
countries lead the world in pollution research. Vast amounts of
money and scientific expertise are poured into projects to determine
the direct and subtle environmental consequences of industrialization."° Such research, however, is extremely complex, particularly
when assessing broad pollution concepts such as the assimilative
capacity of the environment. As a consequence, only the more
identifiable forms of pollution have been studied substantially.
If a factory will emit smoke, make noise, discharge obviously threatening chemicals, or increase dangerously the demand
for oxygen in receiving waters, most countries have the information necessary to assess and prepare for the results. Nevertheless,
when it comes to the more subtle forms of industrial pollution,
95. Taubenfeld, supra note 75, at 478.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 479.
98. Joyner & Joyner, Global Eco-Management and International Organizations.- The
Stockholm Conference and Problems of Cooperation, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 533 (1974).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 188-94.
100. The industrialized countries spend between one and two percent of their gross national product (GNP) for pollution control. Gross & Scott, Comparative Environmental Legislation and Action, 29 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 619, 654 (1980); see generally OECD,
ENVIRONMENT POLICIES FOR THE 1980's (1980).
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very few countries outside Europe,
the United States and Japan
l
have adequate information.1

Industrial countries also have numerous vehicles to disseminate this information. The industrial sector underwrites many
grants, for both private and public institutions, to categorize and
present this data. 0 2 Much of this information finds its way into the
research and planning programs of both intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations, further increasing its availability.
The World ConservationStrategy,"°3 jointly sponsored by the International Union of Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(IUCN), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), is a recent example of successful cooperative dissemination.' ° 4
Yet even in the industrialized countries, there is often a lag
between the need for information and its availability. For example,
in the mid-1970's, Irish authorities approved the siting and development of two industrial plants (one using asbestos, the other using
0 5
acrylonitrile) under a policy of cleaner industrial development.
Evidence of the health hazards posed by the operation of these
plants became available after the plants were opened. 0 6 In the aftermath, an agency head of the research group responsible for evaluating environmental risks said: "[W]e cannot generate the
information on long term health hazards here in Ireland. We are
still dependent on the United States and Britain; sometimes it takes
several years before new scientific information reaches us."' 7
101. Leonard & Morell, supra note 88, at 300.
102. Not surprisingly, critics have charged that much of this research reflects the bias of
the sponsoring agency. C. ENLOE, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 102-08 (1975). Enloe also notes that the sharing of technical and scientific information between industry and government agencies creates a dynamic of "mutual support and
reinforcement. Portraying all interactions between administrators and interest-group spokesman as adversary relations misses part of the reality of bureaucratic politics." Id. at 102.
103. INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY (1980).
104. The WORLD CONERVATION STRATEGY was a jointly sponsored project of IUCN,

WWF and UNEP in collaboration with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). These international organizations first identified conservation objectives
which would allow sustainable development. The requirements to achieve these objectives
were specified and priorities for national and international action were then outlined. Plans
were also undertaken to disseminate this information as broadly as possible. Id. § I.
105. Leonard & Morell, supra note 88, at 300.
106. Id. at 301.
107. Id.
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2. The Perspective in Developing Countries. Access to environmental information in developing countries stands in marked
contrast to that of industrialized countries. In developing nations
there are markedly fewer sources for the dissemination of information.' 0 8 There is also a direct lack of financial resources and technical expertise to conduct local research.' 0 9 Even when the
government recognizes the importance of such projects, researchers
nevertheless receive a low funding priority."' In South Korea, for
instance, only thirteen percent of the necessary funds for 1980 were
allocated to the Office of the Environment to carry out its pollution
control activities. 11
Consequently, the developing countries, to a large extent, lack
the ability to carry out environmental research. When environmental information is needed, these nations must depend on research sponsored, directly or indirectly, by industrialized
countries." 2 This presents several problems. First, there is a time
lag. Without direct dissemination, scientific and technical information must trickle down through international organizations and
governmental agencies in order to become available to the developing countries. "3 If it takes several years for environmental information to reach Ireland- "a country with a ferry to England,
membership in the European Economic Community, and frequently [sic] intercourse with the United States--one can easily imagine how little of this information is available in the Third World
countries .... . 114
Second, developing countries are often skeptical of the research findings of industrialized countries.' 15 The prevailing belief
is that technical solutions to pollution developed by the industrial
nations are designed "to make healthier the consequences of the
Industrial Revolution without necessarily providing a tool for further distribution of its benefits among other States."' "1 6 Conse108.

INTERNATIONAL UNION

FOR CONSERVATION

OF

NATURE AND

NATURAL

RE-

SOURCES, supra note 103, § 12.
109. de Araujo Castro, supra note 21, at 407; C. ENLOE, supra note 102, at 116
110. de Araujo Castro, supra note 21, at 408; C. ENLOE, supra note 102, at 116.
Ii1. Leonard & Morell, supra note 88, at 302.
112. de Araujo Castro, supra note 21, at 408; but see United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, Environmental Policies and Their Implications for Trade and Development: A Case Study of India, at 31-33, UNCTAD/ST/MD/10 (1977).
113. Leonard & Morell, supra note 88, at 301.
114. Leonard & Morell, supra note 88, at 302.
115. de Araujo Castro, supra note 21, at 401.
116. Id.
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quently, developing nations are sometimes reluctant to
unquestioningly accept and use information from industrialized
nations.
Fertilizer and pesticide use in developing countries provides an
example of this problem. Research agencies in industrialized countries have alerted developing nations to the potential environmental
harm of imprudent use of these agricultural chemicals. 1" 7 Yet,
their widespread use is still considered vitally important to the de1
velopment of agriculture in the Third World. 8
Third, developing countries question the legitimacy of technical plans which diminish national prerogatives. Optimally, they
seek information that will allow for economic growth while fostering environmental protection. No-growth strategies are eschewed
in favor of plans which will result in an equitable distribution of
the benefits of shared environments.' ' At present, however, the
scientific and technical information needed to develop such plans is
120
not widely available in developing countries.
Finally, the Third World is further disadvantaged by the lack
of sufficiently trained manpower to effectively use the scientific and
technical information received. For instance, a study of managerial
manpower needed to complete a water quality program in Mexico
revealed a personnel shortage of approximately four hundred percent. 2 1 That disparity will not be reduced, even with an intensive
training program, until the year 2000.122
In sum, the developing countries have limited access to technical and scientific information. Frequently, they are reluctant to use
the information they do receive without first determining political
and economic ramifications. 123 Lacking the ability to conduct local
research, the developing countries select only what they deem relevant. This process often results in local, ad hoc solutions rather
than new environmental policy or law.' 2 4
117. Id. at 403. The most noteworthy consequences of imprudent use of agriculture
chemicals are contamination of food sources and eutrophication. Id.
118. C. FREEMAN & M. JAHODA, WORLD FUTURES 99 (1978).

119. de Araujo Castro, supra note 21, at 403.
120. INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION

OF

NATURE AND

NATURAL RE-

SOURCES, supra note 103.

121.
122.
123.
124.

Schramm, Human-InstitutionalFactors, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 923, 932 (1976).
Id.
de Aravjo Castro, supra note 21, at 413.
Leonard & Morell, supra note 88, at 290-91; see infra text accompanying notes 138-

39.
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C. Characterof Domestic InternationalLaw
The equal right of access is a procedural mechanism to assure
foreign persons nondiscriminatory treatment for pollution injuries. 25 Absent treaty provisions to the contrary, the substance of
this treatment becomes the domestic environmental law of either
the originating or receptor State.' 26 Thus, it is important to examine the character of the available environmental law in the industrial and developing nations vis-ft-vis the implementation of the
equal right of access.
Environmental law, in this context, can be characterized by its
nature and scope. Its nature relates to the principles upon which
the legal rules controlling pollution are based. The State's rationale
for determining violations and attaching liability is derived from
these principles. Scope, on the other hand, refers to (1) the territorial reach of the law and (2) the number of distinct proscriptions of
polluting activities.
1. The Perspective in Industrial Countries. The industrial nations have an abundance of domestic environmental laws. Statute
subject matter ranges from the well-being of endangered flora to
objects falling from outer space.127 Noteworthy is the fact that this
abundance has not resulted in a lack of uniformity among industrial nations. The OECD recently surveyed its membership and
found considerable similarity in their laws' objectives, even though
the laws evolved from substantially different legal systems. 128
A thorough review of the extensive environmental law of industrial nations is beyond the scope of this study. The domestic
environmental law of the United States, however, will be used as an
29
exemplar.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
126. Willheim, supra note 14, at 193-98.
127. See generally OECD, TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION AND THE ROLE OF STATES 191-

202 (1981).
128. See LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION (OECD 1977). "[W]hile there

frequently exists a considerable diversity in the range of procedures available under each of
the national legal systems, the objectives of the majority of such procedures and the interests
which they are intended to protect are broadly similar .
I..."
1d. at 123.
129. It is generally considered that the United States is at the forefront of environmental
law. It has also been noted that most industrialized countries soon follow ground-breaking
judicial decisions and legislation in the United States. Consequently, the use of United
States environmental law represents what the law is in some nations and what it soon will
become in others. See McCaffrey, Private Remedies for Transfrontier Pollution Damage in
Canadaand the United States. A Comparative Survey, 19 U. W. ONT. L. REV. 35 (1981); see
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Under the common law of the United States, there are a
number of bases to attach liability for polluting activities. 3 0 These
include nuisance (both public and private), trespass, riparian rights,
negligence, strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, violation of the public trust doctrine; pollution or contamination with
malice, and possibly even products liability.' 3 '
Federal and state statutes provide an even greater number of
specific rights.' 32 Of particular interest, however, is the expanding
scope of these statutes. Several enactments no longer limit their
reach to the territorial boundaries of the United States, but extend
to environmental impact abroad. For example, in 1979 President
Carter ordered, under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 33 that agencies "assess the positive and negative effects of
proposed action as it affects both the national and international environment."' 34 Although the order still remains controversial, 135 it
appears that in some circumstances the NEPA provisions will be
given extraterritorial effect.
Finally, an illustration of the breadth of United States environ136
mental policy can be found in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act.
Through this statute the United States created legal standing for
foreign persons injured abroad, providing joint and several strict
liability "for all damages, including clean-up costs, sustained by
any person or entity, public or private,
including residents of Can137
ada, as a result of discharges of oil.'
2. The Perspective of Developing Countries. It is difficult to
characterize adequately the environmental law in developing countries. Much of the environmental activism in these countries is ad
hoc. 1 3 8 Government policies do not promote true environmentalism, but rather are a reaction to the economic and social costs of
generally Lutz, The Laws of Environmental Management." A Comparative Study, 24 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 447 (1976).

130. This, of course, presumes that the plaintiff would have standing to sue, proof of
injury, proof of causation, and, when necessary, evidence of fault.
131. McCaffrey, supra note 129, at 46-61.
132. Id. at 61-63.
133. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)C (1976 & Supp.
1981).
134. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(3)(i) (1974) (revised 45 Fed. Reg. 55,990 (1979)).
135. Comment, The ExtraterritorialApplication
of NEFPA Under Executive Order 12,144,
13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173 (1980).

136. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
137. Id. § 1653(c)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1981).
138. C. ENLOE, supra note 102, at 322-24.
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specific environmental crises. The resulting domestic law and trea39
ties simply reflect these reactions.
A 1977 survey 4° revealed that essentially all the developing
countries surveyed had some laws relating to pollution control in
the "basic need" areas, that is, water, air and agricultural land. 14 1
A large number had provisions for regulating pesticides and toxic
chemicals.

42

Conservation was also a major theme.143 However,

in many situations the legislation simply set standards and made no
(or uncertain) provisions for attaching liability.'44 When prima facie liability could be ascertained under a country's laws, negligence
was the most prevalent cause of action. Finally and far less frequently, there were provisions for strict liability for the improper
management of ultrahazardous substances, such as radioactive
material. 145

One reason for the marked absence of definite liability standards in many of these countries is that the government is the primary agent of potentially polluting activities.' 4 6 In some
agricultural development programs, such as those in India, the gov47
ernment is the direct importer and manager of toxic pesticides. '
Also, industrial development programs, such as those sponsored by
the government of the Argentine Republic, indirectly contribute
to
4
pollution by improperly siting major plants and refineries.' 1
Governmental immunity presents another problem. "4 ' Frequently, when the State directly controls polluting activity, it is
viewed as an act of state, foreclosing the possibility of a transnational remedy.' 50 State-licensed industries in the developing countries also frequently claim immunity for their sanctioned acts.' 51
Finally, political dynamics in the Third World directly affect
development of domestic environmental law. Unstable govern139. Leonard & Morell, supra note 88, at 291.
140. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES, supra note 1.
141. See, e.g., Id. at 870820/01.
142. See, e.g., Id. at 879570/07.
143. See, e.g., Id. at 817380/02-03.
144. See, e.g., Id. at 865760/00-13.
145. India's Atomic Energy Act of 1972 is the most prominent example of such strict
liability standards in the Third World. Id. at 855300/13.
146. de Araujo Castro, supra note 21, at 410.
147. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 112, at 18.
148. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES, supra note 1, at 804470/01.
149. J. BRIERLY, supra note 2, at 282-86; see Comment, supra note 2.
150. J. Brierly, supra note 2, at 282-86; Comment, supra note 2.
151. Sand, The Role of Domestic Proceduresin TransnationalEnvironmental Disputes, in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 184 (OECD 1977).
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ments have not jeopardized popular support by restricting polluters
who are also large employers. 5 2 Totalitarian and military regimes
have characteristically been concerned with consolidating their
power and have responded lackadaisically to environmental
problems. 153 As a result, environmental laws, though promulgated,
have "limited value54in a bureaucracy controlled by officials of the
'
executive branch."'
D. The Probabilityof Enforcing Judgments
The bright promise of the equal right of access is that persons
injured by transboundary pollution would have access to judicial or
administrative relief. But few plaintiffs would undertake the burden and expense of litigating in a foreign country if judgments,
once obtained, were not enforced. 55 Without some assurance of
enforcement, the promise of the equal right of access becomes
empty. The probability of enforcing judgments is therefore an important component in the decision to implement the equal right of
access.
The probability of enforcing judgments can be analyzed by examining a number of contributing factors.' 5 6 These include: (1)
the availability of a number of enforcement mechanisms, such as
compensation or criminal sanctions; (2) the degree of environmental harm involved; (3) the effectiveness of the administrative-judicial structure responsible for ensuring compliance with
environmental laws; (4) the complexity of the technology needed to
abate the pollution hazard; and (5) the political, social and economic consequences of enforcing judgments. 151
152. C. ENLOE, supra note 102, at 76-110.
153. Leonard & Morell, supra note 88, at 289-92.
154. Id. at 308.
155. The ordinary victim of transfrontier pollution damage is likely to be shocked
and dismayed when his legal advisers inform him that to recover compensation he
must litigate in a foreign State. It is unlikely that he will have the same confidence
in the impartiality of the foreign courts as he would have in respect of his own
courts. The availability of 'equal right of access' will be but small consolation when
he is faced with the daunting prospect of litigation in a place that is geographically
remote, probably conducted in a foreign language, according to foreign procedures,
and almost certainly according to a foreign legal system . . . . [Llegal aid is less
likely to be available, and he may be called upon to provide security for costs.
Time limits for instituting proceedings may be different.
Willheim, supra note 14, at 180.
156. Zalob, Approaches to Enforcement of Environmental Law: An InternationalPerspective, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 299, 303-10 (1980).
157. Id. at 310.; Lutz, supra note 129, at 506-18. Zalob also identified the nature and
economic power of the polluter as factors that determine enforcement. Generally, "[als a
particular industry gets larger, so too do the possibilities for using a series of enforcement
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Considering these factors, the environmental judgment most
likely to be enforced would be one that (1) sought a legislatively
recognized remedy (2) for an egregious harm (3) in a State with an
effective administrative structure for environmental protection.
Also, it would (4) neither require a complex technological solution
(5) nor adversely affect the political, economic or social stability of
the enforcing State.
Few, if any, actual transboundary pollution injuries would involve such an uncomplicated case. The enforcement probability of
an actual judgment would fall below this ideal but would still be a
function of the same contributing factors. Although not mathematically precise, these factors provide a useful tool to evaluate the relative probability of enforcing judgments.
1. The Perspective in Industrial Countries. Generally, the
prospects for enforcement of environmental judgments in industrialized countries are substantial. 5 8 Among the laws, policies, administrative agencies and technological developments of these
countries, many of the factors favoring enforcement can be found.
For instance, the environmental laws of industrial nations provide
for a wide range of enforcement mechanisms. Although there is
considerable overlap in their application, they can be divided into
five categories: 519 (1) civil remedies; 60 (2) criminal sanctions or
penalties;' 6 ' (3) administrative quasijudicial measures;' 6 2 (4) fiscal
measures; 163 and (5) voluntary restraints.' 64
measures to ensure ultimate compliance." Zalob, supra note 156, at 508. These factors, however, are situationally specific. A full discussion of their contribution to enforcement is beyond the scope of the general comparisons of enforcement probabilities made in this
Comment.
158. See ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, supra note 1.

159. Zalob, supra note 156, at 310.
160. These would include "the entire range of compensatory and injunctive remedies
known to both common law and civil law systems." Id. at 310.
161. Zalob also notes that:
purports to force compliance
The criminal sanction, in environmental control .
through both threat of imprisonment and the social stigma of the criminal label.
However, because many criminal penalty provisions provide for a fine and/or imprisonment of a convicted violator, an accused mayfrequently receive no more than
a fine.
Id. at 312.
162. Administrative sanctions "are designed to abate new sources of pollution and to
regulate pre-existing industries by the issuance and withdrawal of licenses and permits." Id.
at 314.
163. "[F]inancial measures and more particularly tax measures... fare increasingly being employed] to enforce environmental law and regulation. Fiscal measures serve many
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Enforcement mechanisms were specifically reviewed at a recent symposium on private remedies for environmental degradation. 165 Representatives from the twelve participating industrial
countries all reported that compensatory damages were available in
their countries, while only eight indicated that criminal sanctions
were also possible.166 Ten countries provided various forms of injunctive relief but stressed the equitable and discretionary nature of
such remedies.' 67 There were, however, a few nuances in the various legal systems which, even under an equal right of access, would
preclude a foreigner from certain remedies. Illustrative is the Federal Republic of Germany, where a foreigner cannot seek review of
an administrative decision unless the property interest in question
is located within German territory. 168 Overall, however, the survey
presents a picture of integration and consistency in providing enforceable relief in the industrialized countries.
The development of the environmental agency structure has
also increased the likelihood of effectively executed relief. The administrative tribunals created by environmental legislation in the
United States have provided model structures for other industrialized countries. 169 The OECD recently surveyed 7 ° its member
countries and found a dramatic increase in the number of general
environmental agencies as well as those specifically concerned with
the enforcement of judgments.
However, there have been some impediments to enforcement
inthe industrial countries. Courts have been reluctant to saddle
industry with expensive and complex pollution abatement equipment, knowing that the ultimate result would be lost jobs.' 7 ' As a
consequence, some regulatory authorities have adopted a "best
practical means" strategy to pollution control, rather than demandpurposes including the generating of revenue to defray the administrative expenses of carrying out environmental legislation .

Id.
I..."
at 315.

164. Voluntary restraints involve the self-regulatory efforts made by polluters, often undertaken to avoid rigid application of legislative sanctions. Id. at 317.
165. ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, supra note 1. The nations participating in this symposium were: Australia, Austria, Canada, England, Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Hong Kong, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, the United States and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. Id. at 1-2.
166.

Id.

167.

Id.

168. OECD, supra note 42, at 75.
169. Id. at 54-127.
170. OECD, supra note 127, at 133-91.
171. Zalob, supra note 156, at 306.
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ing compliance to an inflexible standard.' 7 2
2. The Perspective in Developing Countries. Environmental
judgments in developing countries are painstakingly obtained and
difficult to enforce. 173 Compared to that in industrialized countries,
environmental justice is an uncertain commodity. The environmental laws of developing countries do not provide as many en74
forcement mechanisms as those of the industrialized countries. 1
Those remedies which are available (usually civil penalties) are
either unrealistic or unattainable given the limited resources for
75
compensation. Injunctive relief is rarely awarded.1
Furthermore, these countries often lack the technological expertise and trained manpower for effective enforcement. 7 6 Newly
drafted environmental laws frequently contain elaborate enforcement provisions. Yet the enforcement programs remain unfunded
even though the law is in effect. For example, the Philippines enacted a comprehensive pollution control law in 1964.177 Due to a
lack of funds, a part-time technical secretary could not be hired for
the controlling commission until 1966.178 A single full-time lawyer
was appointed later that year, but he was not confirmed to the
post. 179 It was not until 1968 that the commission finally began
continuous operation.'o
The institutional-agency structure in the developing countries
is poorly organized and offers little assistance to a plaintiff seeking
enforcement of his judgment. 1 ' "While over 100 countries now
have national environmental agencies of one kind or another,
[those in developing countries] are very small, weak institutionsone-person offices or interagency coordinating committees with no
'82
independent authority."'
Finally, the judiciary in developing countries is plagued by
172. Id. at 307.
173. Leonard & Morell, supra note 88, at 302-09.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 138-54.
175. Leonard & Morell, supra note 88, at 302-09.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
177. Lesaca, Pollution Control Legislation and Experience in a Developing Country: The
Philippines, 8 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 537, 537 (1974).
178. Id. at 547.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Leonard & Morell, supra note 88, at 308.
182. Id.
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political and social pressure. 183 Governments dominated by military juntas or a single political party frequently usurp the autonomy of the courts.' 8 4 Under these circumstances, enforcement
becomes a haphazard affair, subject more to the interests of the executive branch and the political power of the polluter than the controlling environmental law.' 8 5 For example, in 1978 the Mexican
government was under considerable pressure to take action after a
domestic company had created several pollution problems. Rather
than directly confront the problem, the Mexican Health and Welfare Secretariat instead closed the Mexican subsidiary of the Bayer
Corporation, which had done business with the problem-causing
domestic firm.'8 6
In summary, the probability for enforcement of an environmental claim appears quite low. These countries lack the mechanisms, technology, funds and expertise to effect compliance with
judicial decrees. The resulting picture of environmental litigation
standards
in developing countries is one in which environmental
87
unexecuted.
awards
judicial
and
remain unenforced

III.

THE PRACTICABILITY OF AN EQUAL RIGHT OF ACCESS IN
INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The equal right of access is primarily a procedural mechanism. 8 8 It could be added to a State's code by legislation or fiat
without disturbing the substantive environmental law.' 89 At a superficial level, the adoption of an equal right of access would simply reflect a State's willingness to supplant one set of procedures
with another.
But what will determine this willingness? The most important
noneconomic and nonpolitical factor is reciprocity. Reciprocity, in
this context, should be regarded as the granting of equivalent rights
to like foreigners injured by similar forms of transboundary pollution-a procedural quidpro quo between or among States.' 90 How183. Id. at 302.
184. Id. at 308.
185. Id. at 304.
186. Id. at 303. This practice is often referred to as "pollution scapegoating." It is used
to shift social pressure for pollution control away from the government while not alienating
domestic industry. Id.
187. Id. at 304.
188. Willheim, supra note 14, at 193.
189. Under the OECD Principles, the principle of nondiscrimination affects the choice of
substantive law. Id.
190. Since equivalent procedural rights do not currently exist among States, the creation
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ever, reciprocity is not a sine qua non for implementation.' 9' An
OECD survey' 9 2 concludes that "[a]lthough equal right of access
can be introduced by any [S]tate on a unilateral basis and although
its application is not in principle dependent upon complete reciprocity, it is apparent. . . that equal right of access could be more
' 93
easily implemented under such conditions."'
A State's final cost-benefit analysis before entering this quidpro
quo arrangement would likely be quite complex. The legal aspects
of the formula, however, would be measured against (1) the likelihood of receiving similar justice in a foreign court (harmony) and
(2) the presence of distinct differences in the foreign legal systems
impeding full access (inherent legal obstacles). The equation for
the legal variables would thus read: substantial harmony plus few
inherent legal obstacles equals an offer of reciprocity. The remainder of this section will discuss several obstacles inherent in the legal
systems of many States and the perceptions of harmony 9 4 between
the industrialized and developing countries.
A.

Inherent Legal Obstacles

The jurisdictional concept of local action 95 and the principle
of territoriality of law 9 6 frequently impede the implementation of
an equal right of access. The concept of local action, with its underpinnings in the common law, holds that claims for damage to
real property can only be litigated in the jurisdiction in which the
property is situated. Thus, a foreign person pressing a claim for a
transboundary pollution injury against such a State would be obviously disadvantaged. An equal right of access, in that circumstance, could not be fully reciprocal. Commentators have noted,
however, that this principle no longer serves its ancient purposes.
of reciprocal rights would inevitably involve negotiated "something-for-something" exchanges. Note that the more similar (harmonious) the procedural rights are initially, the
fewer the differences that would have to be subjected to negotiation.
191. OECD, supra note 42, at 124.
192. Id. at 54-127.
193. Id. at 125.
194. Harmony is not likely to be a quantifiable term since exact measurements of
equivalent justice are not obtainable. Thus, a State will have to rely on its own perception
and understanding of similar justice to estimate harmony.
195. McCaffrey, supra note 2, at 217-19.
196. Bischoff, The TerritorialLimits of Public Law and Their Implications in Regardto the
Principlesof Non-Discrimination and Equal Right ofAccess as Recognised [sic] in Connection
with Transfrontier Pollution, in LEGAL AsPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 128-45
(OECD 1977).
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They argue that the principle should be rejected in favor of allowing the injured party to choose a forum either at the place of
197
origin or the place of damage.
The principle of territoriality of laws may be equally limiting
to a plaintiff. This principle holds that "national public law cannot
protect any interests situated outside the national frontiers."'198 An
injured foreign person would thus be denied standing in a proceeding which used domestic law.' 99 However, this principle is not
given full force by many countries and is considered by many critics to be an ambiguous concept. 200 The concept of territoriality
poses an obstacle to the equal right of access only in those few jurisdictions which still strictly interpret the principle.2 ° '
In sum, the concepts of local action and territoriality of laws
are not significant deterrents to the adoption of an equal right of
access. These concepts were created to rectify ancient jurisdictional
concerns which may no longer require such restrictive adherence. 20 2 In general, these inherent legal obstacles will be far less
important to a decision to implement an equal right of access than
the lack of harmony between the States.
B.

Perceptionsof Harmony Between Industrialand Developing
Countries

Harmony stands for equivalent justice. This concept does not
imply that States have identical laws or remedies. Given the diversity of environmental laws, a State may well be satisfied by receiving "similar" treatment for its nationals by foreign courts in
exchange for the equal right of access to would-be foreign plaintiffs.
In some instances, the promise of the future development of harmonious law might be sufficient to achieve reciprocal relations. In
either case, harmony is the keystone to the implementation of an
equal right of access.
1. Among Industrial Countries. Industrial countries tend to
define pollution similarly, are highly informed on pollution matters
197. McCaffrey, supra note 2, at 219.
198. OECD, supra note 42, at 125.
199. Id.
200. Bischoff, supra note 196, at 130.
201. Id. at 145.
202. Rest, Transfronhier Environmental Damages: Judicial Competence and the Forum
Delicti Commissi, I ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 127 (1975); see supra text accompanying notes 195201.
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and share common objectives in their domestic environmental
laws.2 °3 Enforcement of judgments for transboundary pollution injuries is also quite likely. 2° Overall, there exists considerable harmony among these countries. The OECD survey 20 5 substantiates
this observation. More importantly, continued harmonious development of laws and pollution control mechanisms is highly likely
20 6
in these countries. Among these countries, a strong foundation
exists for reciprocity and, consequently, an equal right of access.
This outcome should not be surprising, however, since the equal
right of access was drafted largely to provide legal recourse for the
heavily industrialized member States of OECD.2 °7
2. Among Developing Countries. While developing countries
tend to define pollution from a similar perspective, their responses
have been varied and erratic. 20 8 Domestic environmental laws are
often similar in regard to conflicting uses of the environment.20 9 In
other aspects of environmental control, however, there is considerable diversity.2 10 Political and social factors tend to determine pollution remedies as much as litigation.2 1 1 Sovereignty and
nationalism are also inextricably bound to environmental policy in
developing countries. This uncertainty and dissimilarity makes an
equal right of access less likely, though not impossible, in the developing world.
3. Between Industrialand Developing Countries. There is little harmony between industrial and developing world views on
transboundary pollution. Sharp diversity exists in definition, domestic law, judicial and administrative procedures, and available
remedies. 2 Given their current respective positions, reciprocity
would be extremely difficult to attain. An industrial country would
be unlikely to find parallel causes of action in the domestic law of a
developing country.2 13 Consequently, an industrial country would
203. See supra text accompanying notes 64-75, 100-07, 127-37.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 158-72.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 192-93.
206. Further, there are already several existing judicial and legislative precedents of the
equal right of access in industrialized countries. See OECD, supra note 42, at 119.
207. Willheim, supra note 14, at 183.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 76-94.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 138-54.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 144-48.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 149-54.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 127-54.
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be legally and economically disadvantaged by offering an equal
right of access to a developing country. Even if such an offer were
made, the developing country's suspicion of and skepticism about
the industrialized country's concept of pollution control might be
sufficient grounds for rejection.2 14 Absent an increased harmony in
both environmental law and institutional controls for pollution, implementation of the equal right of access between industrialized
and developing countries is highly unlikely.21 5
IV.

CONCLUSION

Pollution has become a menace to modem life. Its ever-present threat has caused a worldwide reevaluation of traditional legal
approaches. This assessment was first formally manifest in the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.21 6 The
conference participants proposed a new course for environmental
action--developing environmental law to attach liability more easily and to provide more surely for a remedy.2 1 v
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development subsequently undertook this challenge and, in turn, proposed
an equal right of access for victims of transboundary pollution injUries. 2 8 This principle assures a foreigner injured abroad access to
the courts and administrative tribunals of the State from which the
pollution originates. Under this regime, a plaintiff is automatically
granted legal standing and can avoid the circuitous and often un2 19
satisfying process of diplomatic relief.
As of yet, however, States have not readily adopted the equal
right of access.22 0 A StateQt-'s decision to implement this regime undoubtedly depends on complex political and economic calculations.
At the core of this equation, however, is the concept of reciprocity. 22 ' Thus, a State would not be likely to open the doors of its
courts and tribunals if it was not assured equivalent justice for its
citizens in a foreign court. Therefore, the greater the similarity between the environmental laws and policies of the States, that is, the
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

de Araujo Castro, supra note
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying

21; see supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
notes 188-194.
notes 7-8.
note 8.
notes 24-31.
notes 41-43.
notes 13-16.
notes 190-94.
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more harmonious their perspectives, the greater the likelihood of
reciprocity and the eventual adoption of an equal right of access.
This Comment has examined the prospects for the implementation of an equal right of access in industrialized and developing
countries. It reveals that these countries distinctly differ on the critical determinants of harmony and reciprocity. Specifically, industrialized countries tend to have: (1) more broadly defined concepts
of pollution;22 2 (2) more ready access to necessary scientific and
technical information; 22 3 (3) a broader character to their domestic
environmental laws; 2 2 4 and (4) more certain enforcement of environmental judgments than do the developing countries.22 5 As a
consequence, prospects for implementation are greatest among the
more harmonized industrial countries.2 26 Developing countries, on
the other hand, have not sufficiently developed their environmental
laws or policies to make implementation practicable either among
themselves or with industrialized countries.2 2 7
At present, dissimilar environmental perspectives between the
industrialized and developing countries pose obstacles to the implementation of the equal right of access. However, these obstacles
may not be permanent. As pollution further menaces the Third
World, governments in developing countries will be pressured to
effectuate pollution controls. 228 The resulting change in their environmental perspectives may then make the equal right of access a
more attractive means to assure private remedies for transboundary
pollution.
James A. Caputo

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See supra text accompanying notes
See supra text accompanying notes
See supra text accompanying notes
See supra text accompanying notes
See supra text accompanying notes
See supra text accompanying notes
Leonard & Morell, supra note 88.
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